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THE INHERENT POWER OF A STATE'S HIGHEST COURT
TO DISCIPLINE THE JUDICIARY
JAMES DUKE CAMERON* **
A proper balance must exist between the need for an independent
judiciary and the need for discipline or removal of judges who, because of
misconduct or disability, have become a threat to the integrity of the court or
an embarrassment to the judicial system. The judiciary is a branch of
government which by the nature of its duties often must check and defeat the
popular will. It would not long remain independent if removal of judges
from office was easily accomplished by the other popularly supported
branches of government. 1 Judicial independence, however, should not be
used as a shield against judicial discipline. The American Bar Association's
Proposed Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability 2 provide
an effective method for judicial discipline through judicial removal and
disability commissions while also serving to protect the independence of the
judiciary. But judicial removal and disability commissions are not the
exclusive methods of judicial discipline, and the Proposed Standards recog-
nize that with a commission created by state constitution there are alterna-
tive methods and procedures for the discipline and removal of judges.
There are four basic methods of disciplining judges: (1) legislative
discipline which generally is limited to impeachment but may also include
removal by address; 3 (2) public discipline, such as failure to reelect or retain
judges in states having election of judges;4 (3) commission discipline where
* Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court; Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Profes-
sional Discipline of the Appellate Judges' Conference and the Standing Committee of Profes-
sional Discipline, American Bar Association.
** I am indebted to Ms. Lynda Pollock, my law clerk, for her help and assistance in the
preparation and proofing of this article.
1. 84 HARv. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1971).
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
& DISABILITY (1977) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED STANDARDS and referred to in the text as
the Proposed Standards]. The PROPOSED STANDARDS are printed in the appendix.
3. Address is a form of removal by legislative action for conduct that does not warrant
impeachment. In the few states that have judicial removal by address, it is seldom used.
4. Recall of judges is also used to remove judges in a few states. Recall is a method of
removal where the power is either granted to or reserved by the people. Jones v. Harlan, 109
S.W.2d 251, 254 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937). Recall of judges was used in many states during the
populist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Arizona was required to
remove the provision for recall of judges from its constitution before President Taft and
Congress would approve statehood. After admission to the Union in 1912 the voters of Arizona
approved a provision that again made recall a part of the Arizona Constitution. ARIZ. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1 (1910, amended 1912). There is still a provision for recall in the Arizona
Constitution today. ARiz. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1 (1910, amended 1912).
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judicial removal and disability commissions have authority; 5 and (4) judicial
discipline through the exercise of the inherent power of a state's highest
court.
The first three methods of judicial discipline are provided for by
specific terms in state constitutions. The first, legislative discipline, is
cumbersome and expensive and, therefore, is seldom used. The second,
public removal, cannot be relied upon as a predictable method of discipline.
This method has the additional defect of being, at times, a threat to the
independence of the judiciary because it may remove judges for unpopular
decisions rather than for misconduct. 6 By contrast, the third method, com-
mission discipline, is a fair and flexible method of judicial discipline which
protects the independence of the judiciary. Further, judicial removal and
disability commissions have a high degree of public and professional accept-
ance.
The fourth method of judicial discipline, exercise by a state's highest
court of its inherent power, is the least recognized and the least used. This
article will discuss the source and extent of such a court's inherent power.
WHAT IS INHERENT POWER?
Courts throughout history have exercised powers never expressly be-
stowed upon them, but which pertain to their own survival as courts. Such
power is sometimes described as "implied," "essential," "incidental," or
"necessary." It is most often described as "inherent." 7 This power is
essential to the existence, dignity and operation of a court, particularly the
state's highest court. Such power is impliedly given when a court is
created. 8 The power is implied because it is indispensable if a court is to
perform the duties specifically assigned to it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
described the existence of inherent power when it stated:
When the people by means of the Constitution established courts,
they became endowed with all judicial powers essential to carry
out the judicial functions delegated to them. . . .But the Con-
stitution makes no attempt to catalogue the powers granted ...
These powers are known as incidental, implied, or inherent pow-
ers, all of which terms are used to describe those powers which
must necessarily be used by the various departments of govern-
ment, in order that they may efficiently perform the functions
imposed upon them by the people.9
5. These commissions are a recent innovation and function in more than forty states.
Hearings on S. 1110 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 172-73 (1976).
6. E.g., Archie Simonson, a Wisconsin judge, was unseated in a recall election after
stating that there was a connection between women's clothing and rape. Chicago Tribune, Sept.
8, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
7. See Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935).
8. Id.
9. State v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, 402, 226 N.W. 385, 386 (1929).
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The term "inherent power" also includes that power which the courts have
traditionally exercised even though the reason for the exercise of such power
may be lost in history.
It is the premise of this article that a state's highest court, as the court
most concerned with the operation of a state's judicial system, has the
inherent power to supervise the conduct of judges both on and off the bench
when such conduct affects the administration of justice. This inherent power
has its source in the common law, in the separation of powers of the three
branches of government, in the supervisory power of the state's highest
court, in the power of the court to promulgate standards of judicial ethics or
conduct, and in the power of the court over the conduct of members of the
bar. 10
SOURCES OF INHERENT POWER
Historical
The United States Constitution, as well as the constitutions of forty-
nine states, was written in light of the English constitutional experience. 1
Further, the common law of England at the time of this country's indepen-
dence formed the basis of American common law. 1
2
In England judges holding office "during good behavior by patent
from the King" were removable by writ of scire facias from the King's
Bench, and persons holding lesser offices were subject to proceedings in the
court in the nature of quo warranto. 3 Although these two actions were used
where the term of a judicial appointment had expired, they were mainly for
violations of good behavior. 1
4
The King's Bench could also impose discipline less severe than remov-
al from office. As Professor Berger notes:
By virtue of its 'general Superintendency over all inferior Courts,'
King's Bench could punish judges of lesser courts by Attachment
for Contempt 'for acting unjustly, oppressively, or irregularly,'
'for any practice contrary to the plain rules of natural Justice....
as for denying a Defendant a Copy of the Declaration against him
, * or for compelling a Defendant to give exorbitant bail' and
putting the Subject to unnecessary Vexation by colour of a judi-
cial Proceeding wholly unwarranted by Law.' '[T]he Court of
King's Bench, by the Plenitude of its Power, exercises a Superin-
10. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 274 N.E.2d 454 (1971).
11. A possible exception is Louisiana which based its constitution on the civil law of
France.
12. Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 582-84 (1887).
13. Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution (pts. 1-3), 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870, 882 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as Shartel].
14. Id. at 882-83.
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tendency over all inferior Courts, and may grant an Attachment
against the Judges of such Courts for oppressive, unjust or irregu-
lar Practices, contrary to the obvious Rules of Natural Justice." 5
At the time the United States became a separate nation, the King's
Bench, which was independent of Parliament and the King, exercised its
power to discipline and remove judges. In fact, the judges who were
appointed for good behavior insisted on having the protection of scire facias
proceedings in the court when they were threatened with removal. When Sir
John Walter incurred the displeasure of Charles I in 1628 and was asked to
surrender his patent, he refused to do so on the ground that he should be
removed only if scire facias determined that he had violated the "good
behavior" requirement. 16 As Professor Berger has pointed out:
Thus a highly placed judge affirmed that his office could be
forfeited for misbehavior in a scire facias proceeding. At a time
when impeachments were humming around the heads-of Charles's
ministers, Chief Baron Walter wisely preferred trial by judges to
the political ordeal of impeachment. In 1672, Charles II, following
the example of his father, tried to dismiss Sir John Archer, a
Justice of Common Pleas, a court which ranked with King's
Bench. Justice Archer also 'refused to surrender his patent with-
out a scire facias.' Both the Walter and Archer cases were cited in
1692 before Chief Justice Holt and his associate Justices by Ser-
jeant Levinz, who had himself been a Justice; and Holt made the
significant remark that 'our places as Judges are so settled, only
determinable upon misbehavior."
17
Although scire facias is not used in the United States, quo warranto has
been used to discipline a judge.18 Just as the King's Bench had the power to
impose judicial discipline and removal, so, too, the American courts have
this power unless it is specifically limited by the state constitutions.
Separation of Powers
Based upon the separation of powers among the three equal branches of
government, a state's highest court possesses inherent power to discipline
judges. To deny a state's highest court the power to discipline members of
the judiciary would be to deny such a court equality with the other two
branches. The basic idea behind separation of powers is that the three great
branches of government must be separate, coordinate and equal. 19 Each
branch must be free to function without restriction, supervision or interfer-
ence by the other two branches.
2°
15. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475,
1503 n.142 (1970) (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 1480.
17. Id. at 1481 (citations omitted).
18. E.g., State ex rel. Saxbe v. Franks, 168 Ohio St. 338, 154 N.E.2d 751 (1958)
(municipal judge was disbarred and then removed from office via quo warranto).
19. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1934).
20. Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, 7 TRIAL 22 (Nov./Dec. 1971).
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The separation of powers doctrine implies that each branch of govern-
ment has inherent power to "keep its own house in order," absent a specific
grant of power to another branch, such as the power to impeach. 2 This
theory recognizes that each branch of government must have sufficient
power to carry out its assigned tasks and that these constitutionally assigned
tasks will be performed properly within the governmental branch itself. 22
In writing the United States Constitution, the framers rejected execu-
tive removal of the judiciary. 23 The constitutional fathers also rejected
legislative removal, such as bills of attainder, 24 bills of pains and penal-
ties,' and address, 26 and kept only impeachment, which is a cumbersome
and awkward method of legislative removal. They were not as afraid of
judicial power as they were of executive and legislative power. As Justice
Traynor once noted, "the events from 1775 to 1790 convinced the colonists
that an unchecked legislature was potentially as tyrannical as an unchecked
king. . . . Such men as John Adams and James Madison were as much on
guard against elective despotism as executive despotism. "27
Although the founding fathers rejected executive removal and limited
legislative removal to impeachment, they did not similarly restrict a court's
common law power of judicial discipline. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, for example, asserting its power to inquire into the conduct
of a judge, proclaimed its source of power to be "the inherent common law
and constitutional powers of [the] court."' Through the exercise of its
inherent power, that court also established by court rule a Committee on
Judicial Responsibility. 29 The rule establishing this committee states in part:
On its own motion, or on complaint by any person, the Committee
shall inquire into and investigate the alleged physical or mental
incapacity of any judge; allegations or misconduct or maladminist-
ration in office, wilful or persistent failure to perform duties,
habitual intemperance or other conduct prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute; and
any alleged act which may violate the Code of Judicial Conduct
(Rule 3:25). On completion of any inquiry or investigation which
21. Comment, The Limitations of Article III on the Proposed Judicial Removal Machinery:
S. 1506, 118 PA. L. REV. 1064, 1067-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE III].
22. See Traynor, Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REV. 1266 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Traynor].
23. Battisti, An Independent Judiciary oran Evanescent Dream, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
711, 726 n.76 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Battisti].
24. A bill of attainder was a legislative act directed against a person declaring him guilty of
an alleged crime, often treason, and sentencing him to death. Losier v. Sherman, 157 Kan. 153,
138 P.2d 272 (1943).
25. If a sentence was less than death, it was called a bill of pains and penalties. Id.
26. See note 3 supra.
27. Traynor, supra note 22, at 1273 (citation omitted).
28. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 274 N.E.2d 454 (1971). See also In re Troy, 364 Mass.
15, 306 N.E.2d 454 (1973).
29. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:17.
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cannot be dealt with fairly and properly on an informal basis, the
Committee shall recommend an appropriate disposition of the
matter with a statement of its reasons and shall forward its final
recommendation to this court for its consideration and further
action, if any.
30
Just as the legislative branch has the power to judge the qualifications
of its own members and to discipline them, the judiciary, through the state's
highest court, has the power to discipline members of the judicial branch.
The state's highest court has this power because it is responsible for the
judicial branch and because the power has not been granted to either of the
other two branches.
The separation of powers doctrine, however, has had the practical
effect of limiting the common law power of the court to permanently remove
a judge from office. The power of impeachment has been viewed as
conferring the exclusive power of removal from office upon the legisla-
ture. 3 ' For example, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adopted by court rule the Committee on Judicial Responsibility, it was quick
to note:
The Supreme Judicial Court's action does not confer on the
Committee or the Court any power to remove a judge from office
for either incapacity or misconduct. In the absence of an amend-
ment to the Massachusetts Constitution, these powers are various-
ly reserved to the Legislature, the Governor, and the Executive
Council. The Court's action does, however, provide a systematic
and consistent procedure for the receipt and processing of com-
plaints against judges.
32
This view of the impeachment power has not been shared by some commen-
tators. Both Professor Sharte133 and Stewart A. Block' assert that the
impeachment power granted to Congress does not necessarily negate judi-
cial forms of removal.
The American courts, however, have not interpreted impeachment
power in the way suggested by commentators like Professor Shartel. While
it appears there is a common law historical basis for removal of judges by a
jurisdiction's highest court, no cases exist where a court has removed a
judge from office based on the court's inherent power to discipline a judge.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court expressed what appears to be the
opinion of the American courts when it stated: "Candor compels the
30. Id.
31. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J. 1475,
1488 (1970).
32. Office of the Executive Secretary, Supreme Judicial Court, Boston, Mass., Press
Release (Feb. 2, 1977).
33. Shartel, supra note 13, at 891-98.
34. LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE III, supra note 21.
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recognition, at the very outset, that the judiciary has no power of impeach-
ment. . . .The judiciary has not been granted the removal power by this
method, either by the constitution or the common law." 35 This is not to say
that American courts could not be so empowered even though the state
legislature retains the power of impeachment. A state's constitution may
give the courts that power. The Louisiana Constitution, for example, grants
the legislature the power of impeachment and also grants the Louisiana
Supreme Court power to remove a judge of a court of record for any of the
causes specified in the impeachment articles. 36 The Texas Constitution at
one time gave the state supreme court the right to remove a judge upon
petition of ten lawyers who practiced in the judge's court." The Indiana
Constitution also provides for removal by the state supreme court.
38
Nonetheless, even if only the legislature can remove a judge by way of
impeachment, absent constitutional provision to the contrary, a state's
highest court still has the inherent power to discipline short of removal. In
discussing this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
These statements mean only that, when a judge is removed, he
must be removed by the constitutional method. They do not say
that sanctions short of removal are constitutionally defective.
Also, in those jurisdictions where censure, contempt, and suspen-
sion have been employed as sanctions by the judiciary, there was
a constitutional provision vesting in the legislature the power to
remove judges. In spite of this, other supreme courts have held
that they could impose these other sanctions short of outright
removal.
39
The furthest a court has gone in this regard is to disbar a judge and thereby
remove a requirement for his continuation in office. Thus, although the
American courts do not generally recognize a power to remove judges from
office where that power is constiutionally reserved to the legislature, this has
not affected their inherent power to impose discipline short of removal from
office.
Supervisory Power
The supervisory power gives a state's highest court the power to
oversee the administration of justice in inferior courts. Inherent in this
power is the power to supervise the actions of the officers and personnel of
35. In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, 100, 289 A.2d 403, 404 (1972); Cf. In re Colorado Bar
Ass'n, 1370 Colo. 357, 325 P.2d 932 (1958) (discipline and disbarment of attorneys).
36. LA. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1921, amended 1974); see Standley v. Jones, 201 La. 549, 9
So. 2d 678 (1942).
37. In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183, 265 S.W.2d 805 (1954); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1891,
repealed 1949).
38. State v. Dearth, 201 Ind. 1, 164 N.E. 489 (1929); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. 7, § 11.
39. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 522-23, 235 N.W.2d 409, 415 (1975) (citations omitted).
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the judicial system in order to protect the integrity of the judicial system.
Professor Shartel has stated:
[T]he Supreme Court already possesses supervisory authority
over inferior federal judges. . . The Court of King's Bench in
England, representing the King as the fountain of justice, always
asserted and still asserts supervisory authority over the conduct of
inferior judges. With this precedent in mind, it can fairly be said
that supervisory authority is a common law attribute of a superior,
or at least of a supreme, court; it can be said that supervisory
authority is an inherent part of supreme judicial power; it can be
said that the exercise by our Supreme Court of supervisory au-
thority over the conduct of inferior judges requires no other war-
rant in the Constitution than the grant to it of the supreme judicial
power. 40
This supervisory power should be distinguished from the appellate
power of the court. An appellate court's review function exercises a form of
discipline because judges may be reversed and mild rebukes may be ad-
ministered. However, the power to discipline judges based upon the super-
visory power is unlike that based on this power to review cases. Acting in an
appellate capacity, the court reviews cases for correctness. In a supervisory
capacity, however, the court is acting regardless of the correctness of any
particular case. Inherent in the supervisory power of the state's highest court
is power to discipline the judges as well as to supervise the operation of the
courts. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers when
it required judges to file an annual financial disclosure. In so doing the court
stated:
In addition to the inherent power of this court, we find an addi-
tional source of authority for this court's promulgation of the
Judicial Code and of Rule 17 in the power which is reasonably
implied from this court's express constitutional authority to exer-
cise 'a general superintending control over all inferior courts.'
This power of superintending control is 'unlimited in extent...
undefined in character . . . [and] unsupplied with means and
instrumentalities.' . . . The superintending power is as broad and
as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of justice.
in the courts of this state.
4'
Power to Regulate Judicial Ethics
Some courts have exercised their inherent power through the adoption
of codes of judicial conduct. 42 Forty-six states43 have adopted the American
40. Shartel, supra note 13, at 731-32 (citations omitted).
41. In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519-20, 235 N.W.2d 409, 414 (citations omitted).
42. Not all states agree. Oklahoma, for example, has held that the Canons of Judicial
Conduct are persuasive but not mandatory. Nix v. Standing Comm'n on Jud. Performance of
Okla. Bar Ass'n, 422 P.2d 203 (Okla. 1966). Louisiana has held that the Canons of Judicial
Conduct do not, of themselves, have the force and effect of law. In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241
So. 2d 469 (1970); State ex rel. Gremillion v. O'Hara, 252 La. 540, 211 So. 2d 641 (1968).
43. Comment, The Procedures of Judicial Discipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190, 196 (1976).
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Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Conduct.' After adopting the Canons,
state courts have then claimed the power to enforce them. Actually, the
power to adopt and enforce such canons was always in existence, but the
process of adopting canons of conduct first, and then enforcing them, is
often more palatable to both the courts and the public.
In 1967, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a Code of Judicial
Ethics and stated:
We hold this court has an inherent and an implied power as the
supreme court, in the interest of the administration of justice, to
formulate and establish the Code of Judicial Ethics accompanying
this opinion. It governs judicial acts of a judge in his official
capacity and certain personal conduct which interferes or appears
to interfere with the proper performance of his judicial conduct.
This power, inherent in the supremacy of the court and implied
from its expressed constitutional grants of supervisory power,
embraces all members of this court not only because they are
lawyers but also because they are judicial officers in a court
system constituting the judicial branch of the state government
with a solemn duty to perform their judicial duties well.
45
The same court, in 1972, adopted rules for the implementation of the Code
of Judicial Ethics including the establishment of a judicial commission. 
6
Adoption and enforcement of a canon of judicial conduct has the
advantage of giving notice to the judges of the standard of conduct expected
of them. It also has the advantages of public support of a court's actions in
enforcing what is generally agreed to be an exemplary standard for judges.
Politically, this method may be one of the easiest and most acceptable ways
of exercising a court's inherent power in the area of judicial discipline.
Power Over the Bar
That a state's highest court has the power to control who may be
admitted to the bar is not seriously questioned today. Most states, by their
constitution, require that a judge of a court of record be a member of the bar.
The court which has the power to disbar an attorney can, of course, disbar a
judge and thereby remove a requirement for continuing in office. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the power to discipline
a judge was based at least partially on "the power of [the] court to maintain
and impose discipline with respect to the conduct of all members of the bar,
either as lawyers engaged in practice or as judicial officers. . . . "47 Ac-
cording to the New Jersey Supreme Court:
44. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Canons.
45. In re Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 254, 153 N.W.2d 873, 874 (1967).
46. This was done in anticipation of a constitutional amendment authorizing removal or
suspension of judges. In re Code of Judicial Ethics, 52 Wis. 2d vii, 191 N.W.2d 923 (1972).
47. In re DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 757, 759, 274 N.E.2d 454, 456 (1971).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
[t]he question then is whether from all of the foregoing, it should
be inferred that the disciplinary power may not be invoked be-
cause the judicial office would be lost as a consequence of disbar-
ment. . . . The answer is that if membership at the bar is required
for continuance in judicial office, the requirement is completely
consistent with the exercise of the disciplinary power. Far from
denying that power, the prescription would confirm it, for in
demanding that the incumbent continue to measure up to the high
standards of the profession, reliance is necessarily placed upon
the continued exercise of the disciplinary power by the agency
vested with it. Hence if judicial office should be lost in the wake
of disbarment, that consequence would be precisely what the
Constitution contemplated.w
s
Not all states agree with that philosophy. Some courts, possibly be-
cause of reluctance to allow the members of the bar to sit in judgement of a
judge, have held that the bar has no jurisdiction to disbar a sitting judge."
Georgia and Michigan both have held that disbarment of a judge does not
automatically result in removal from office .5 Tennessee has held that a
judge may be disbarred only after removal by impeachment. 51 Nevertheless,
the sensitivity of the courts to a "trial" of sitting judges by attorneys should
not deter a state's highest court from using disbarment as a means of judicial
removal. Since the courts have the power to disbar, they have, in effect, the
power to discipline a judge for conduct which would call for attorney
discipline. A state's highest court may be required to resort to this method of
removal when the legislature will not impeach and the state's constitution
does not provide for a judicial removal commission.
5 2
INHERENT POWER AND THE PROPOSED STANDARDS
The Proposed Standards recognize the inherent power of the courts in
the field of judicial discipline. For example, Standard 1.1 states "The power
to discipline judicial officers is inherent in the state's highest court."
5 3
The Proposed Standards also designate the areas in which courts have
such inherent power. For example, Standard 1.1 notes the power to recom-
48. In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 269-70, 168 A.2d 38,43-44(1961). See also In re Gurnik, 45
N.J. 115, 211 A.2d 777 (1965).
49. See, e.g., Alabama State Bar ex rel. Steiner v. Moore, 282 Ala. 562, 213 So. 2d 404
(1968); In re Colorado Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 393, 325 P.2d 932 (1958); In re Investigation of
Circuit Judge, 93 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1957); In re Meraux, 202 La. 736, 12 So. 2d 798 (1943); In re
Board of Comm'rs of State Bar, 65 N.M. 332, 337 P.2d 400 (1959).
50. Gordon v. Clinksdales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960); In re Moes, 389 Mich. 258,
205 N.W.2d 428 (1973); In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973).
51. Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 209 Tenn. 304, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1961), rehearing
denied. See also In re Alonzo, 284 Ala. 733, 223 So. 2d 585 (1969).
52. But see In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973), where the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the Judicial Tenure Commission was without authority to remove a
judge for conduct which resulted in a "loss or suspension of a license to practice law." Id. at
309, 205 N.W.2d at 439.
53. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 2, at No. 1. 1 (emphasis added). See appendix.
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mend impeachment of a judicial officer.5 4 Anyone, of course, may recom-
mend that impeachment proceedings be brought; however, the state's high-
est court may, in addition, set up a procedure for investigating a derelict
judge and recommending his impeachment when necessary. Some states
provide for this power, though it is not necessarily specified as impeach-
ment. For example, the constitutions of Michigan and Illinois at one time
provided that their supreme courts could recommend to the legislature
removal of a judge. 5 In fact, however, this was a form of removal by
address with each state's highest court making the recommendation.
Standard 1.1 also authorizes the state's highest court to discipline a
judge as an attorney.56 This includes the power to disbar a judge and,
thereby, remove a prerequisite to the holding of judicial office. In those
instances where there is no judicial removal and disability commissions and
the legislature will not act, the state's highest courts may be forced to take
this action to insure the integrity of the judicial branch.
The Proposed Standards further provide less harsh disciplines such as
suspension with salary. 57 This sanction is frequently necessary when a judge
has been charged with a serious crime and it would be inappropriate for him
to continue in office while the verdict was pending. 58 Other forms of
discipline which a state's highest court may invoke to preserve the orderly
judicial process include censure, reprimand, and administrative sanctions
such as transfer and reassignment of duties.59 These lesser sanctions are
most effective when the conduct does not warrant removal but is serious
enough to merit some form of discipline. A state's highest court should be
quick to use its inherent power to impose these sanctions where there is no
judicial removal and disability commission to provide for the lesser forms of
discipline.
Finally, the Proposed Standards recognize the power of a state's high-
est court to take emergency action. 6° Use of this power would be appropri-
ate, for example, where a judge is charged with a felony. The judge then
should be suspended immediately by the state's highest court until such time
as the judicial removal and disability commission or the supreme court itself
can act further.
54. Id.
55. Shartel, supra note 13, at 872 n.6. See Ransford v. Graham, 374 Mich. 104, 131
N.W.2d 201 (1964), where the Michigan Supreme Court shared a form of removal by address
with the state legislature.
56. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 2, at No. 1.1. See appendix.
57. Id.
58. The Ohio Supreme Court, after the bar had recommended disbarment, suspended a
judge until the matter could be determined by the court. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 31
Ohio St. 2d 187, 287 N.E.2d 632 (1972).
59. PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 2, at No. 1.1. See appendix.
60. Id.
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It should be pointed out, however, that even though the Proposed
Standards clearly recognize the inherent power of courts to act in the field of
judicial discipline, where properly functioning judicial discipline commis-
sions exist, the courts should defer to them. Recognizing the value of
deferring to such commissions, the Commentary to the Proposed Standards
states that where there is a constitutional provision for a judicial removal and
disability commission, the court should not exercise its inherent power
unless it is absolutely necessary. 61 At least three reasons mandate such an
approach. First, the judicial removal and disability commission serves the
function of discipline and probably can perform better than a state's highest
court. Second, there should be public support for the commission's actions
because it is created by the state's constitution. Interfering with its operation
could undermine that support and respect. Third, since a state's highest
court usually acts as the review body for a judicial disciplinary commission,
it can exercise its review function with far less difficulty if it defers to the
commission in the first place.
POWER OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY TO DISCIPLINE
Most authorities, including the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, agree that impeachment is the sole method of disciplining a federal
judge. Justices Douglas and Black have maintained that judicial sanctions
interefere with the independence of the federal judiciary and cannot be
tolerated:
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He
commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise
sovereign. But neither one alone nor any number banded together
can act as censor and place sanctions on him. Under the Constitu-
tion the only leverage that can be asserted against him is impeach-
ment. . . there is no power under our Constitution for one group
of federal judges to censor or discipline any federal judge. . . . It
is time that an end be put to these efforts of federal judges to ride
herd on other federal judges. This is a form of 'hazing' having no
place under the Constitution. Federal judges are entitled, like
other people, to the full freedom of the First Amendment. If they
break a law, they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit
in cases in which they have a personal or family stake, they can be
impeached by Congress. But I search the Constitution in vain for
any power of surveillance which other federal judges have over
those aberrations .... 62
Others have suggested, however, that there exist alternate methods for
61. Id. at COMMENTARY accompanying No. 1. 1.
62. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136-37, 140 (1970)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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removal or discipline of federal judges besides impeachment. Professor
Shartel 63 contends that the common law judicial discipline proceedings were
not affected by the separation of powers doctrine in the United States
Constitution.' He argued that the doctrine did not stand in the way of
removal of judges by judicial action even though it impliedly abolished
every executive and legislative method of removing judges except impeach-
ment.65
The view that there are alternatives to impeachment has fueled legisla-
tive attempts to establish alternate means for disciplining or removing
federal judges. In the past all such attempts have been rejected allegedly
because of doubts as to the constitutionality of the bills. Nevertheless, at
present there is a proposal before Congress entitled the "Judicial Tenure
Act" which was introduced by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia in 1975. 6 In
introducing this proposed act, Senator Nunn stated:
My bill will provide an alternative removal procedure. This legisla-
tion is not intended in any way to displace the right of Congress to
impeach judges under the Constitution. It is just another removal
mechanism. This bill is based on the constitutional premise that
the independent judicial bench, as the exclusive holder of federal
judicial power, has the inherent power to enforce the standard of
conduct required of its members. It provides machinery to imple-
ment this power.
67
It is this writer's contention that the Supreme Court of the United States
does possess the same inherent powers of judicial discipline as do the state
courts. The federal legislature is empowered to create courts inferior to the
United States Supreme Court' and to restrict the jurisdiction of the judicial
branch. 69 That legislative ability does not carry with it the power to limit the
Court in the exercise of its historic common law power and powers inherent
and implied by both the separation of powers and the grant of supervisory
power.
It is incongruous that the United States Supreme Court, which has been
bold and activist in decision-making and in protecting individual rights, has
been timid in the exercise of its inherent right to keep the federal judiciary
free from scandal. A court, which by its nature must make unpopular
decisions, cannot withstand judicial conduct which generates suspicion and
63. Shartel, supra note 13 at 723, 870.
64. Id. at 899.
65. Id.
66. See Battisti, supra note 23, at 727-32, for an extensive discussion of this bill and
previous legislative proposals. See also Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29, 36-39
(1977).
67. 121 Cong. Rec. 5719 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1975).
68. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § i.
69. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
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contempt and makes its decisions less acceptable to the public. Judicial
independence cannot be used as an excuse to ignore judicial misconduct.
CONCLUSION
Thomas Jefferson once stated that everyone in public life should be
answerable to someone.70 Judges are no exception. 71 The Proposed Stan-
dards rightfully emphasize the creation and operation of judicial removal
and disability commissions. This emphasis is appropriate and necessary
since judicial removal and disability commissions are the most efficient and
acceptable way to provide a framework of judicial discipline which also will
protect the independence of the judicial system. It should not be forgotten,
however, that without a judicial removal and disability commission, a
state's highest court possesses broad inherent powers in this field, powers
which should be exercised when necessary. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court has stated:
The people of New Jersey, in adopting our present Constitution,
reposed in the New Jersey Supreme Court. . . exclusive respon-
sibility for the making of rules concerning practice and procedure
in the courts thereby created, and for the admission and discipline
of those admitted to the practice of law. The constitutional voice
of the people thus vested in the Supreme Court a responsibility to
'keep the house of the law in order,' and this responsibility obvi-
ously extended to the conduct of judges as well as attorneys in
practice.72
Failure to exercise the inherent powers of a state's court, particularly in
the field of judicial discipline, invites legislative encroachment. This is a far
greater threat to the independence of the judiciary than is the exercise of
self-discipline by the judicial branch of government. The Proposed Stan-
dards go a great distance in stating what the law should be concerning
judicial removal and disability commissions. They also delineate the inher-
ent powers of a state's highest court in the field of judicial discipline. Thus,
the Proposed Standards should be a good guideline for judges and a useful
tool for each state's highest court.
70. See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON THEN AND Now (J. Wise ed. 1943).
71. See Traynor, supra note 22, at 1279 n.21.
72. In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 189, 351 A.2d 740, 742 (1976) (citations omitted).
